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The Curious Origins of Judicial Review 
TT Arvind and Lindsay Stirton* 
 
 
Introduction: “The greatest achievement”?  
 
This article tells the story of the birth of modern judicial review. In the 
conventional account, the judge-led development of judicial review is one of 
the great successes of the twentieth century common law: “the greatest 
achievement of my judicial lifetime”, as Lord Diplock famously put it.1 On this 
interpretation, from the mid-twentieth century onwards, the judiciary 
abandoned its earlier quiescence and, building on doctrines, approaches and 
remedies that had been used to control inferior tribunals since Victorian times, 
fashioned a new body of law capable of subordinating the administrative state 
to the rule of law.2 The modern law is thus seen as representing the same 
common law commitment to the rule of law seen in early cases such as Entick 
v Carrington3 and Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works4, revived in the 
monumental Wednesbury5 decision and extended by Lord Reid in the ‘Quartet’,6 
and finally systematised by Lord Diplock, in GCHQ.7  
 
This article challenges this story of continuous unbroken development. On the 
face of it, the cases from Ridge to GCHQ did indeed draw on an older line of 
case law. Yet, as we demonstrate, the 1960s and 1970s were a transformative 
period in administrative law. Underlying the seeming doctrinal doctrinal 
continuity and consolidation, lay a deeper conceptual and theoretical 
discontinuity—a fundamental shift of approach in relation to the questions of 
how, why and to what end the courts should provide redress against 
government bodies.  
                                                 
*  Newcastle Law School and Sussex Law School, respectively. This paper is part of a 
broader project funded by the Nuffield Foundation to study the impact of the Human 
Rights Act.  We are grateful to the Foundation for their support. We would also like to 
thank Carol Harlow, Richard Kirkham, Daithí Mac Síthig, and participants at the Public 
Law Conference 2014 in Cambridge for their comments on earlier drafts of the paper. 
Lindsay Stirton thanks Edinburgh Law School, where he was a MacCormick fellow while 
completing this article. All file references in this article refer to archival materials held at 
the National Archives. 
1 R v Inland Revenue Commissioners ex parte National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Business 
Ltd [1982] AC 617, 641. 
2 See for example W Wade and C Forsyth, Administrative Law (11th, Oxford University Press 
2014) 10–13; this view is challenged to an extent by S Sedley, ‘The Sound of Silence’ 
(1994) 110 LQR 270. 
3 Entick v Carrington (1775) 19 State Trials 1029. 
4 Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 CB (NS) 180, 143 ER 414. 
5 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Cororation (1948) 1 KB 223. 
6 The ‘Quartet’ is sometimes used to denote four monumental House of Lords 
administrative law decisions of the 1960s, Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40 (HL); Conway v 
Rimmer [1968] AC 910 (HL); Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 
997 (HL); and Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 1 AC 147 (HL). 
7 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] 1 AC 374 (HL). 
2 
 
 
 
 
Our purpose in this article is to call attention to the fact of this shift, the 
process by which it occurred, and the profoundly limiting implications it had 
for the incipient discipline of administrative law. As we show in Part 1 of this 
article, for much of the twentieth century, jurists saw the tasks of 
administrative law as one of mediating conflicts between public and private 
interests. The growth of the administrative state, it was thought, required not 
just the development of new remedies but also the creation of a common law 
of public bodies, which would define the proper extent of public powers and 
provide guidance that would ultimately improve the practice of administrators 
whose work necessarily brought them up against private interests. In stark 
contrast with modern administrative law, it was taken virtually for granted that 
this would necessarily involve the development of substantive principles which 
spoke directly to the balance between private interests and the public interest.  
 
How, then, did we end up with a system of judicial review that abandoned 
both these planks of mid 20th century juristic thought? In Parts 2 and 3, we 
use a detailed examination of the key texts of that period, including previously 
unexamined records in the National Archives, to show that this shift was born 
out of a conscious rejection of this ‘mediating’ conception of administrative 
law, and a subsequent reorienting of the law around the entirely ‘public’ task of 
ensuring that public bodies discharge their statutory and common law duties. 
This shift responded to concerns about the judicialisation of administration 
raised by sections of the government, and shared by one senior judge, who 
were alarmed at the possible intrusion of the judiciary into questions of public 
policy. Behind the appearance of continuity with the older law, therefore, lay a 
form of review that was very different from what anyone in the 1960s might 
have envisaged, both in terms of the kinds of decisions that would be 
reviewed and the grounds on which that review would be based. As we 
demonstrate in Part 4, key aspects of modern judicial review doctrine reflect 
the concerns that lay behind this shift.  
 
Our purpose in telling this story is not simply historical. In the final, 
concluding part of this paper, we argue that whilst the motivation behind the 
shift away from the ‘mediating’ conception to the ‘public’ conception was 
laudable, the resulting system of judicial review must be taken to have failed to 
achieve its objectives. These failures which acquire particular relevance in the 
context of governmental attempts around the common law world to restrict 
judicial review ostensibly “to ensure that the right balance is struck between 
reducing the burdens on public services, and protecting access to justice and 
the rule of law.”8 If, as we argue, the source of the problems lies in a system of 
judicial review designed to eschew questions of “merit”, then the focus of 
                                                 
8 Ministry of Justice, Judicial Review: Proposals for Reform (Cm 8515, 2012) para 6. The 
responses to the consultation were implemented by the Civil Procedure (Amendment No 
4) Rules 2013, SI 2013/1412 (L. 14) and Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, s 84-92. 
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recent and ongoing reforms on restricting the availability of judicial review are 
unlikely to solve the problem—and may even make it worse, by forcing 
complainants to plead alternative, less suitable grounds or seeking alternative 
forms of redress. Truly addressing the problem will require us to revisit the 
issues which were at the forefront of debate in the first half of this century, 
but which have never received a satisfactory resolution.  
 
 
I.  A forgotten orthodoxy 
 
A  The demise of private law constitutionalism  
By the late 1950s, there was a broadly held sentiment that the United 
Kingdom lacked an effective system to supervise the administrative state. 
Persons with legitimate grievances against the state were unable to obtain 
redress for no reason other than that the law gave them neither a forum 
before which nor a language of actions in which they could articulate their 
grievances. This sentiment was not new. It had been on the rise for much of 
the 20th century, growing as the administrative state grew and took on more 
functions. What was new, however, was a sense that existing common law 
doctrine did not and could not provide the answer, and that a new approach 
was needed.9  
 
For much of the first half of the twentieth century, common law thinking 
about the problem had been dominated by ‘private law constitutionalism.’ It 
was thought that the law of tort, in particular, gave the courts all the tools they 
might need to keep administrative bodies in check. Yet it soon became 
apparent that tort law was not actually restraining executive overreach, not 
least because procedural and remedial hurdles meant that suits could in 
practice only succeed if the department concerned co-operated.10 Nor did 
abolishing the doctrine of Crown immunity help. When it came in 1947, the 
Crown Proceedings Act was hailed as “the greatest legal reform of the past 
hundred years.”11 Lord Denning, speaking extra-judicially, said that the Crown 
Proceedings Act had “placed the Government Departments fairly and squarely 
under the law.”12 He saw particular potential in equity which, through doctrine 
of estoppel,13 and the remedies of the injunction and declaration,14 would 
                                                 
9 E. C. S. Wade, for example, expressed the sentiment with great clarity, in referring to “the 
inadequacy of the common law and the methods of its judges to control what has been 
called by one recent writer the law of statutory discretions.” ECS Wade, ‘Introduction’ in 
A V Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (9th ed, Macmillan 1939) 
xviii. 
10 For a full discussion, see TT Arvind, ‘Restraining the State through Tort? The Crown 
Proceedings Act in retrospect’ in TT Arvind and J Steele (eds) Tort Law and the Legislature 
(Hart Publications 2012). 
11 LCO 2/3362, Morgan to Mayell, 20 February 1947. 
12 AT Denning, The Rule of Law in the Welfare State (Birkbeck 1953), reprinted in AT Denning, 
The Changing Law (Stevens 1953) 20–44, 24. 
13 ibid, 39–40. 
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pronounce on rights, restrain the executive from interfering with them, and 
hold the government to its commitments.  
 
Ultimately, however, private law proved to lack the conceptual tools it would 
have required to become the central plank of legal accountability of 
government. The Crichel Down affair, for example, was almost universally 
seen at the time as an example of executive overreach, but neither the tort of 
trespass nor any other private law action would have given a remedy, because 
in this case—as in many others—the actions were done in purported exercise 
of a statutory power.15 Nor was this episode out of the ordinary. Post-war 
governments had embarked on several ambitious schemes requiring the 
acquisition of privately-held property—improving the quality of the housing 
stock, building council houses, road-building, improving agricultural 
production, among others. There was a perception that the government had 
been cavalier in pressing ahead with such schemes, while the procedures for 
acquisition as well as the compensation paid was unfair. In one such case a 
landowner faced with compulsory acquisition committed suicide; in another 
the compensation paid was less than a hundredth of the amount outstanding 
on a mortgage on the property.16 Yet there was no forum to provide an 
independent review of these decisions, nor did private law provide any redress.  
 
An initial response was to find fault not with the courts, but with the 
expanded role of government—and with the ‘unconstitutional’ behavour of 
Parliament in conferring ‘judicial’ powers on ministers and other offical 
tribunals. Hewart’s The New Despotism17 and C. K. Allen’s Bureaucracy 
Triumphant,18 are prominent examples, though the general attitude manifested 
itself in much mainstream legal thought. The power of the court to declare an 
exercise of power ultra vires was, as W. I. R. Fraser argued, “a most valuable 
safeguard against unduly autocratic action”, yet was limited in its usefulness if 
Parliament “does not define the powers reasonably clearly.”19 The same view 
had been expressed by Sir Cecil Carr,20 and before that by the report of the 
Donoughmore Committee.21 But a return to the old style of drafting, 
conferring limited powers on administrative officials which Parliament would 
tightly police, was infeasible because the new policies pursued by the incipient 
British administrative state required the grant of broad, widely framed powers. 
A new approach was needed if the challenges posed by the growth of the state 
were to be dealt with.  
                                                                                                                                                        
14 Alfred Thompson Denning, Freedom under the Law (Stevens and Sons 1949). 
15 For a full discussion of the Crichel Down affair, see IF Nicholson, The Mystery of Crichel 
Down (Clarendon Press 1986). 
16 See the press clippings in T 222/671. 
17 G Hewart, The New Despotism (Earnest Benn 1929). 
18 CK Allen, Bureaucracy Triumphant (Oxford University Press 1931). 
19 WIR Fraser, An Outline of Constitutional Law (William Hodge 1948) 184. 
20 Cecil Thomas Carr, Concerning English Administrative Law (Humphrey Milford/ Oxford 
University Press 1941) 50–51. 
21 Report of the Royal Committee on Ministers Powers (Cmd 4060, 1932).  
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In the received telling, the story of what happened next appears clear. Faced 
with the collapse of private law constitutionalism, judges and jurists looked 
instead to modernise the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of the High 
Court. In effect, the intellectual baton passed from the private law 
constitutionalists to a new generation of “common law rationalisers”, a set of 
practitioners, academic commentators, and senior court judges who sought to 
achieve with the prerogative writs what equity and tort had not achieved. They 
did not necessarily deny that the system of prerogative orders was incapable 
(in its then current form) of providing effective remedies against the Crown 
and other public bodies. But they thought that the principles inherent in the 
common law could provide the basis for reworking the details of the rules on 
judicial review. They were conscious that Victorian judges had assiduously 
kept magistrates under control through these writs. Whilst the passing of 
administrative functions to a professional administrative class meant that the 
judiciary were prepared to cede that ground to civil servants, they now had 
reason to revive and adapt these older powers. And, through incremental case-
based development, distilled and systematised through successive editions of 
treatises and academic commentary, this is precisely what they managed to 
achieve.  
 
Yet if we set this received account to one side and focus instead on what was 
actually being said and done in the 1950s and 60s, a very different picture 
emerges. Writings from the period make little or no reference to the 
prerogative writs as instruments of redress, or as ways of controlling 
administrative bodies. Although texts on the prerogative writs continued to be 
written, of which the first edition of S. A. de Smith’s Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action22 was perhaps the outstanding exemplar, this work was 
self-consciously expository and was not seen as charting a path to a fully-
fledged system of redress of grievances concerning the discretionary decisions 
of the executive.23 Few things illustrate this as clearly as the evidence offered 
to the Franks Committee. Oral and written evidence was given by virtually 
every leading jurist and legally concerned organisation of the day and, despite 
the narrowness of the Committee’s remit, those giving evidence invariably 
expressed views on what a fully evolved system of administrative law might 
look like, and the place different adjudicative institutions might occupy within 
it. The prerogative writs, however, do not feature significantly in any of these 
accounts.24 Even more surprising, given its centrality to modern administrative 
                                                 
22 SA De Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Stevens and Sons 1959). 
23 J. A G. Griffith put it pithily in a review of the first edition of de Smith’s treatise, when he 
described the book as being “about ‘the law’ and touches only occasionally on the 
prophets”. JAG Griffith, ‘Judicial Review of Administrative Action’ (1960) 18 CLJ 228. 
24 De Smith was the only witness to discuss the prerogative writs in detail, and he expressly 
stated that his evidence was concerned only with the law as it was, and offered no view on 
what the law should be. Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Inquiries, Minutes of 
Evidence Taken Before the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Inquiries: Appendix I 
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law thinking, is that Wednesbury review was not discussed.25  
 
What we see, instead, is the formulation of proposals for reform that were on 
their face very diverse – ombudsmen, tribunals, new administrative courts, and 
new divisions of the High Court all had their partisans – but which 
nevertheless reflected a clear consensus about the broad contours of what 
would need to be done to deal with was seen, in essence, as a two-fold 
problem: of providing effective redress against administrative action and hence 
bringing the administration under legal control, and of facilitating the growth 
of a commitment to legality in the administrative branch through the creation 
of a common law of good administration. Seen from our position half a 
century later, it is startling to see that this emerging consensus bore little 
resemblance to what we now know as the law of judicial review. For it not 
only rejected the prerogative writs as instruments of redress and control, but 
also expressly repudiated three of the central shibboleths on which modern 
judicial review is founded: firstly, the modern position that judicial review 
should resist any direct engagement with the substantive merits of a decision; 
secondly, the modern view that judicial review seeks to protect the public 
interest rather than the private interest of the claimant; and thirdly, the modern 
understanding that both of these are necessary to avoid drawing the judiciary 
into matters of policy.  
 
B  The emerging juristic consensus  
(a) Substantive review and the administration  
Let us begin with the first of these. In the 1960s, it was taken for granted that 
the legal system must provide redress going to the merits of the case—not just 
in the trivial sense that any review of discretionary powers necessarily involves 
some consideration of the merits, but in the sense of giving express 
consideration as to whether the decision was right or wrong in substantive 
terms, and developing doctrines which speak to these substantive questions. 
Equally, it was taken for granted that this redress must expressly address the 
private interests at stake, and their relationship to broader public interests. 
This was of fundamental importance not just from the point of view of the 
subject, but also from the point of view of the administrative departments, 
because it was only through such a focus that a proper common law of good 
administration could evolve.  
 
The idea of a common law of good administration was expressly discussed in a 
report from JUSTICE published to mark the tenth anniversary of the 
landmark Whyatt Report.26 In a pamphlet published earlier in 1955, the Inns 
of Court Conservative and Unionist Society had called for the establishment 
                                                                                                                                                        
(HMSO 1956) 8-11. 
25 Cf. Sir Stephen Sedley’s aphorism that, “Far from being the point at which public law 
woke up, the Wednesbury case is a snore in its long sleep.” Sedley (n 2) 278. 
26 K Goodfellow, Administration Under Law (Stevens 1971). 
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of an Administrative Division of the High Court as a means to facilitating the 
development of a judge-made administrative law.27 JUSTICE took up this call, 
but their proposal went further. The point to such a Division, they argued, was 
that it would facilitate the evolution of a common law of public bodies, 
incorporating a common law conception of good administration. This could 
be most effectively achieved if Parliament provided a basic legislative 
scaffolding of ‘Principles of Good Administration’, which judges could then 
develop and elaborate on in the usual common law way of reasoning upwards 
from individual cases. In tandem with this, the report recommended a revision 
of the grounds of judicial review to include breaches of the Principles. The 
remedies would include the power to vary or reverse a decision as well as to 
award damages.  
 
This proposal built upon a line of thinking that JUSTICE had already set out 
in the Whyatt Report,28 and which reflected a more widely held view as to the 
purpose of administrative law. Whyatt had drawn a distinction between cases 
where, on the one hand, the source of grievance was that a discretionary 
power had been exercised wrongly — where “there may be no allegation of 
bias, negligence or incompetence but merely the charge that the decision is 
misguided” — and on the other hand cases involving an allegation of official 
misconduct or ‘maladministration’.29 Where complaints of maladministration 
were made, Whyatt recommended the creation of a new Office of 
Parliamentary Commissioner, based on the Scandinavian Ombudsman.30 
Misguided discretion, however, demanded a different form of redress. Whyatt 
argued for the removal of such decisions from Ministers to a reformed and 
rationalised tribunal system. Such a “comprehensive system of impartial 
adjudication”, Whyatt argued would “go far towards providing every citizen 
with a means of redress in the field of administrative law as complete and 
effective as he has, for centuries, enjoyed in the realm of common law.”31  
 
Underlying this was a concern not only for the rights of the citizen, but also 
for the conduct of the business of the administration in a manner that was 
both effective and in keeping with fundamental constitutional principles – 
described variously as requiring “judicial habits of mind”32 or the inculcation 
of “administrative morality.”33 This, it was thought, required the introduction 
                                                 
27 Inns of Court Conservative and Unionist Society, The Rule of Law (Conservative Political 
Centre 1955). 
28 J Whyatt, The Citizen and the Administration (Stevens 1961). 
29 ibid para 10. The term ‘maladministration’ had earlier been used in the Franks Committee. 
30 The idea had earlier been championed by the libertarian Society for Individual Freedom, 
which still claims the establishment of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Administration as one of its greatest contributions. See TE Utley, Occasion for the 
Ombudsman (Christopher Johnson 1961). 
31 Whyatt (n 28) para 69. 
32 WA Robson, Justice and Administrative Law: A Study of the British Constitution (1st ed, 
Macmillan and Co 1928) 327. 
33 JDB Mitchell, ‘Law, Democracy and Political Institutions’ in Mauro Cappelletti (ed), New 
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of ‘judicialised’ ways of thinking into the administration itself. For W. A. 
Robson, one of the keenest advocates of this view, one of the most significant 
constitutional developments of the Twentieth Century was the “placing by 
Parliament of a large and increasing number of judicial functions…in the 
hands of the great departments of State, or under the jurisdiction of tribunals 
controlled directly or indirectly, or appointed by executive ministers of 
government.”34  
 
Far from posing a threat to the British constitution, these multifarous statutory 
jurisdictions, if suitably reformed, could provide a forum for the redress of 
grievances more suited to an age of increasing collective control over broad 
areas of economic activity and social policy. What mattered was that public 
powers were met with the development of judicial technique and attitudes on 
the part of administrators, something which Robson thought could be 
accomplished, “only by the introduction of specific institutional reforms and 
procedural safeguards in the machinery of adjudication”35 Robson’s work is 
not short on specific proposals as to the form such institutions should take. 
Of greater importance to Robson’s juristic contribution, however, was the 
overall goal of ensuring that discretionary powers were exercised by those with 
judicial habits of mind.  
 
Robson was not alone. Lord Reid, the author of a series of judgments from 
Burmah Oil to Anisminic that would reshape administrative law, had provided a 
foretaste of the dynamic potential of the common law to re-work itself in the 
face of what, writing extra-judically, he called an “impenetrable maze of 
distinctions and qualifications which destroy certainty”.36 But while Reid was 
constrained by the nature of judicial office, another celebrated common 
lawyer, F. H. Lawson, in evidence to the Franks Committee, put forward a 
radical and unrestrained vision of how the common law might provide 
‘external control’ over the discretionary judgments of administrators. A very 
great deal of the traditional jurisdiction of King’s Bench, he pointed out, 
related to what would today be considered public law.37 Lawson proposed 
accordingly that “there should be no limit whatever to the jurisdiction of the 
Courts”, save perhaps a de minimis exception,38 although he fully expected 
that the Courts would adopt a sliding scale of review, so that while there might 
be a strong “presumption of legality” where the conduct of Ministers were in 
                                                                                                                                                        
Perspectives for a Common Law of Europe (Sijthoff 1978) 361, 373; JDB Mitchell, ‘The State of 
Public Law in the United Kingdom’ (1966) 15 ICLQ 133, 147 
34 Robson, Justice and Administrative Law (n 32) 90 
35 WA Robson, Justice and Administrative Law (2nd ed, Stevens and Sons 1947) 333 
36 Lord Reid, ‘The Judge as Law Maker’ (1973) 12 Journal of the Society of Public Teachers 
of Law 22, 24 
37 FH Lawson, ‘What is wrong with our administrative law?’ in FH Lawson (ed), Many Laws: 
Selected Essays Volume 1 (North-Holland Publishing Company 1977) 285. 
38 Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Inquiries, Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the 
Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Inquiries: Ninth and Tenth Days (HMSO 1956) 355. 
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question, the jurisdiction itself must necessarily be unlimited.39 Judicial control 
of the administration was nothing to be feared, either for the volume of 
litigation that might ensue, or for the threat of judicialisation of the 
administration. The character of the courts meant that, as Lawson put it in oral 
testimony, judges would “not be tempted to interfere a great deal and will look 
upon it as their business to check abuses.”40  
 
The same underlying concern motivated the work of even those who took the 
(at first blush) seemingly incompatible view that the courts were ill-equipped 
to deal with administrative appeals. These critics did not, in general, disagree 
with the diagnosis of the problem but only with the institutional solutions 
proposed. J. D. B. Mitchell, for example, thought that the Ombudsman “fit so 
uneasily with the British doctrine of ministerial responsibility as to be 
irreconcilable with it.”41 Control by the ordinary courts, too, had numerous 
defects: courts were excessively concerned with procedural defects rather than 
substantive merits; remedies hindered efficient administration without actually 
redressing the wrongs done to citizens; and the law’s concern with technical 
distinctions of executive or quasi-judicial powers meant that important powers 
escaped judicial control, while in other cases decisions were overturned though 
no injustice was done. The problem with all of this, Mitchell argued, was that 
“it has prevented the courts from developing and applying any general concept 
of administrative morality.”42  
 
Before 1688, the Privy Councils of Scotland and England had operated what 
Mitchell regarded as an embryonic form of administrative jurisdiction. Mitchell 
(in a memorandum jointly signed with J. A. G. Griffith) now wrote to Lord 
Shackleton, Lord Privy Seal and first Minister for the Civil Service proposing 
that the Privy Council should be reconstituted along the lines of the French 
Consei d’État.43 This idea, too, had surprisingly broad support. Dicey had in 
his later years come to question whether the ordinary courts might not, after 
all, be “the best body for adjudicating on the offences or the errors of civil 
servants”, speculating that a better solution might be something analogous to 
the Conseil d’État, a “body of men who combined official experience with 
                                                 
39 Lawson (n 37) 284. 
40 Administrative Tribunals and Inquiries, Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Committee on 
Administrative Tribunals and Inquiries: Ninth and Tenth Days (n 38) 347. Like many others of 
his time, Lawson thought the development of the system of criminal appeals, where 
judges had broad powers of review but had developed systems to ensure that they did not 
interfere with the merits, demonstrated that they would be able to do the same in 
exercising substantive review over administrative action. 
41 JDB Mitchell, ‘The Irrelevance of the Ombudsman Proposals’ in DC Rowatt (ed), The 
Ombudsman: Citizen’s Defender (Allen & Unwin 1968) 280. 
42 JDB Mitchell, ‘The Causes and Effects of the Absence of a System of Public Law in the 
United Kingdom’ [1965] PL 95, 113. 
43 See BA 17/31, Memorandum by Griffith and Mitchell, undated, c. 1968. (“Mitchell 
Memorandum”) 
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legal knowledge and who were independent of the government of the day.”44 
Lawson, similarly, suggested a court in which recently-retired permanent heads 
of department would sit as administrative judges along with justices of the 
Queen’s Bench Division.45 H. W. R. Wade had mooted the idea in his 
evidence to the Franks Inquiry,46 and Sir Leslie Scarman had written in favour 
of the idea, in an article in New Society.47 In 1966, the Inns of Court 
Conservative and Unionist Society put forward a detailed case for what they 
termed an “Administrative Commission” within the Privy Council, as an 
alternative to an Ombudsman scheme, which they thought would provide 
insufficient protection for individual rights.48  
 
(b) The private interest  
The view that administrative law must provide an adjudication on the merits 
of discretionary judgments – that, as Robson put it, “some form of appeal 
from the substance of a decision is required in the more important cases”49 – 
was closely linked to a view that the purpose of administrative law was to set 
standards of mediation between the public interest and private interests. 
Whilst procedure, natural justice and legality had their place in achieving such 
a mediation, the consensus was that, ultimately, the source of most complaints 
was that the individual50 felt hard-used by the state. The rule of law mandated 
the development of broad principles not just as to how decisions should be 
made, but also as to the appropriate balance between the rights of individuals 
and the requirements of efficient administration.  
 
It is critical to note that the emphasis was on “striking a balance”,51 rather than 
on the simplistic protection of private interests against government 
encroachment. On this issue, Robson again set the tone. “The aim of a sound 
body of administrative law”, he wrote, “should be neither to disappoint the 
reasonable expectations of the possessors of private rights, nor cripple the free 
activities of the individual, nor yet again to enable the executive tyranny to 
masquerade under a colourable imitation of judicial sanction.”52 What was 
                                                 
44 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th ed, Macmillan 1915) xlv 
45 Lawson (n 37) 286. 
46 Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Inquiries, Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the 
Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Inquiries: Thirteenth and Fourteenth Days (HMSO 
1956) 551-553 
47 L Scarman, ‘A New Court’ New Society (London, 5 June 1969) 1. 
48 Inns of Court Conservative and Unionist Society, Let Right be Done (Conservative Political 
Centre 1966); a civil servant’s critique can be found in M Smith, ‘Thoughts on a British 
Conseil d’Etat’ [1967] Public Administration 23. 
49 Robson, Justice and Administrative Law (n 35) 409–10. 
50 It is worth noting that much of the debate in the period under study treated the problem 
as if it were almost exclusively concerned with individual citizens—and, specifically, as the 
Whyatt report put it, with “the little man... the little farmer with four acres and a cow” 
rather than persons with substantial resources Whyatt (n 28) xiii. 
51 Mitchell, ‘The Causes and Effects of the Absence of a System of Public Law in the United 
Kingdom’ (n 42) 102. 
52 Robson, Justice and Administrative Law (n 35) 516. 
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needed was “a body imbued with the judicial spirit which will weigh the 
reasonable needs of the Executive against the interests of the citizen.”53 At the 
same time, there was a similarly broad consensus that while an imbalance of 
power between the citizen and the state was the fundamental problem, the 
point of reform was not, as Goodfellow put it, to “suddenly tip the 
constitutional balance against the state and in favour of the citizen.”54 It was 
detrimental to effective administration if orders were set aside where there was 
no substantive injustice, or where the harm might have been cured by a less 
destructive remedy.  
 
For the authors of the Whyatt report, the underlying principle was one of 
impartial adjudication of disputes between citizens and administrators: an 
Ombudsman “should, in fact, be regarded neither as simply the ‘watchdog’ of 
the public nor the apologist of the administration, but as the independent 
upholder of the highest standards of efficient and fair administration.”55 Asked 
in cross-examination before the Franks Committee whether a right of appeal 
from an administrative tribunal would be in the interest of the individual or 
the state Lawson replied, “I think it could be in both the interests of the public 
and of the private person.”56 Maintaining administrative integrity and speed of 
decision-making was as much of a concern to reformers as protecting private 
rights, and the two were not at odds with one another. “A reconciliation of 
these objectives”, wrote Mitchell, “is possible, but is beyond the reach of 
present systems in this country which frequently satisfy neither demand,”57  
  
                                                 
53 Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Inquiries, Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the 
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(c)  The place of policy  
Thirdly, and finally, there was broad agreement that the bounds of this system 
must be set in a way that avoided interfering with decisions that were truly 
matters of policy, whilst at the same time encompassing decisions that were 
merely questions of law or fact dressed up as policy. While it was taken as a 
given that policy-making should not be subject to judicial interference, the 
reformers had a fairly precise understanding of what was meant by ‘policy’. 
Not every exercise of discretion was a matter of policy, nor did policy 
encompass all substantive norms. Lawson considered the view that courts do 
not interfere in policy decisions to be “undoubtedly sound”, but nonetheless 
argued (citing Griffith and Street in support) that, “[t]he real question with 
regard to policy relates to the boundary between questions of policy and 
questions of fact.”58 For Mitchell, “the root of the whole present malaise is the 
fact that we have lost any real idea of what is a political decision, and by 
extending the concept unreasonably…we have brought great trouble on 
ourselves.”59 In other words, while the machinery of administrative justice, 
however created, should not concern themselves with the sort of matters that 
were regularly discussed in Parliament, the concept of policy should not be 
expanded to effectively include the whole of executive decision-making. In 
particular, it did not have the meaning which it would later acquire, equating it 
with the administrator’s view of the merits.60  
 
Robson’s views provide a good illustration as to the prevailing view of policy. 
Robson said that the distinction between policy and law was “doubtful”, and 
argued that “one can distinguish ‘policy’ from ‘law’ only in theory”.61 He 
proposed that when constituting an administrative tribunal, the Minister 
should prepare a Letter of Reference, or Instructions, which formulated and 
openly declared the policy that the tribunal should follow.62 Others went to 
the extent of arguing that safeguarding policy actually required the courts to 
embrace substantive principles. If substantive principles were not explicitly 
embraced, the argument went, the less desirable alternative would be a 
distortion of the law as judges sought to attack decisions of policy by 
“subterfuge”, as Lawson thought had happened in Board of Education v Rice,63 
where “various judges offended at what appeared to be a most unfair decision, 
decided that the wrong question had been asked and the right question had 
not, though anyone reading the case would have the greatest difficulty in 
ascertaining what they thought to be the right question.”64 In other words, if 
administrative justice required that the exercise of discretion were to be 
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reviewed on the merits, then it equally required that the basis of such review 
should be articulated explicitly in doctrine and principle. The reformers would 
simply not have recognised the modern orthodoxy that courts are only 
concerned with how a decision is reached, rather than with its substantive 
merits.65 The law, as the reformers understood it, was capable of developing 
doctrines that embraced the substance of a decision, so that a strict opposition 
between legality and correctness was nonsensical.  
 
Despite the disagreements as to where responsibility for control of 
administration should lie, therefore, there was substantive agreement as to what 
responsibility for control of administration should encompass. The central 
task of administrative redress was mediating conflicts between the public 
interest and private interests and, through doing so, to develop principles of 
good administration. Naturally, there were differences of detail. Could the 
Court of Queen’s Bench, suitably reorganised, provide appropriate external 
control, or would this new task require the creation of some new court? Was 
this even a job for a court, or was some other institutional form— 
administrative tribunals, or the Scandinavian ombudsman—better suited to 
inculcating what Robson variously called ‘the judicial temper’ or ‘the spirit of 
justice’ (among other phrases) within the expanding administrative role? Could 
such new adjudicative institutions, however constituted, be left to develop the 
necessary doctrines by themselves, or did this require the support of a 
legislative scaffold? But these were seen as secondary considerations, 
pertaining to how the goal of a forum for resolving grievances between the 
citizen and the state could be realised in practice, rather than of the character 
of the task to which such a forum would be devoted.  
 
Our intention here is not to suggest that the view presented here was the only 
view in currency. As is well known, prominent political and intellectual figures 
in the inter-war period argued that socialism would require a fundamental 
restructuring of powers in favour of the executive and administration. Stafford 
Cripps proposed delegating vast amounts of legislative power to the executive, 
and completely excluding all judicial control over ministerial orders with 
Parliament having the sole right to challenge orders.66 Parliament itself would 
be reorganised away from the task of legislation: the bulk of its work would be 
done in its standing committees, whose task would be to supervise the 
functions of the Government in particular areas.67 Harold Laski went further, 
and thought that the government “would have to take vast powers, and 
legislate under them by ordinance and decree”, in a manner that excluded even 
Parliamentary control by suspending “the classic formulae of normal 
opposition.”68 Nevertheless, these thinkers were outside the mainstream even 
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of left-wing thought. The view we have outlined encompassed, in whole or in 
part, the views of such diverse thinkers as C. K. Allen, Lord Denning, A. V. 
Dicey, F. H. Lawson, J. D. B. Mitchell, W. A. Robson and H. W. R. Wade, 
among others, not to mention organisations as diverse as The Society of 
Individual Freedom, the Conservative and Unionist barristers, and JUSTICE. 
An approach that commanded support amongst such a broad range of jurists, 
including not just individuals espousing a very diverse range of political and 
jurisprudential positions but also most of the leading commentators of the 
day, in our view is far more representative of mainstream thought, and merits 
the label of an ‘orthodoxy.’  
 
What, then, happened to this legal orthodoxy? What caused this seeming 
consensus to falter, and disappear so thoroughly not just from the landscape 
of law reform but also from legal memory? Why and how did we come to 
have a system of administrative law that is so fundamentally different in 
virtually every respect from what jurists in the 1950s and 1960s would have 
envisaged? As we will show in the remainder of this article, the present shape 
of the law is the unintended outcome of actions that were undertaken with the 
best of intentions, and with the participation of leading judges. But to 
appreciate this, we must first turn to the views of an important group of 
whom little account is taken in histories of judicial review, but who were its 
primary targets—namely, the administrators themselves.  
 
II. The view from the administration 
 
Unsurprisingly, the bureaucracy dissented from the jurists’ diagnosis of the 
problems posed by the administrative state. This is not because they were 
sanguine. Although there were a few exceptions, such as the Treasury official 
who in the 1920s declared grievances against the administration to be “a well-
recognised form of hallucination”, attributable to “a fairly well-recognised 
class of semi-lunatics,”69 the civil service on the whole was as troubled as 
jurists by the issue and by its impact on public perceptions of civil servants. 
The 1950s and 60s, accordingly, saw a number of official reviews of 
administrative processes and practices in parallel with the independent reviews 
which we have examined above. Yet unlike the independent reviews, the 
official reviews eschewed just about any substantive question, concentrating 
instead on narrower matters of procedure.  
 
The archival record demonstrates quite unambiguously that this narrowness 
was the result of concerted action by permanent officials within the 
departments. Two themes were constant in the departmental responses. The 
first was the insistence that any legal remedy against administrative action 
should be narrow. Of particular concern was the possibility of reviewing day-
to-day discretion, or decisions of policy, and fear that these could be subject to 
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judicialised rules of law. The second was the insistence that the proper forum 
for questioning these was Parliament—in particular, through ministerial 
responsibility and the institution of the parliamentary question.  
 
In taking this stand, officials did not underestimate the nature or extent of the 
problems highlighted by the reformers. Permanent officials in the departments 
were sensitive both to constitutional principle and to “the continuing 
alienation of the individual from the Government”, and agreed that the a 
system devoted to the public interest must “respond to individual 
grievances.”70 Following the Crichel Down affair, an internal Treasury memo 
considered establishing a committee headed by Sir Thomas Padmore, a 
permanent secretary to the Treasury who dealt with personnel and staff 
management, to study what might be done to address the public perception 
that “Ministers and civil servants are judges in their own cause.”71 Sir Edward 
Bridges, the head of the Home Civil Service, approvingly cited Dicey and put 
together a memorandum which informed a series of meetings to consider a 
broad range of questions in relation to which action might be taken.72 The civil 
servants’ objection was, rather, with the proposed solution. Their principal 
concern was the suggestion that the exercise of administrative discretion 
would be subject to rules of law setting limits on what the administration 
could or could not do. This, they felt, would destroy administrative discretion, 
which of its nature was not capable of control by law. Equally, they worried 
about the damage to other pillars of administration. The sacrosanct nature of 
communications between civil servants and ministers seemed to be 
incompatible with broader discovery. And they feared that civil servants would 
become more pliable, and less able to stand up to ministers in an extreme 
government.  
 
The reaction of the civil service to the proposal to set up the Franks 
Committee is a good example. In 1955, in the aftermath of the Crichel Down 
affair, the Conservative party’s election manifesto promised to set up a “strong 
advisory committee” to look into “the machinery of tribunals, of public 
enquiries and of departmental decisions affecting individual interests and 
property.” The aim was to ensure that “a just balance should be struck, and 
seen to be struck, between the interests of the individual and those of the 
community” in the normal exercise by the government of its powers.73 This 
troubled the permanent officials. In a memo circulated to other permanent 
secretaries, Bridges described this commitment as “very alarming,” because it 
might lead to the creation of a new tribunal whose jurisdiction would extend 
to departmental decisions generally.74 He convened a meeting of a small 
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number of senior officials to discuss the advice which should be given to a 
future Conservative government on this pledge. Were such a tribunal to be 
created, the meeting decided, the effect would be that “innumerable cases 
affecting individuals would be removed from the responsibility of 
departmental Ministers”, ranging from exchange control cases to “the 
eligibility of cattle for deficiency payments.” Calling decisions of this kind into 
question would seriously impair the functioning of the machinery of 
government, and would detract from resolving what the meeting saw as the 
main issue – “the improvement of the machinery of tribunals and public 
enquiries.” The advice that should be given to Conservative ministers should 
they be elected, it was decided, would be to “modify” the manifesto 
commitment to enquire into “the machinery of department decisions”. The 
way of doing this was to suggest that such an enquiry would “go to the root of 
the relationship between Parliament and the Executive”—if put this way, it 
was thought, Ministers would “readily appreciate that the subject was better 
left alone.”75  
 
The Permanent Secretaries’ plan was ultimately successful. The Franks 
Committee’s terms of reference were deliberately restricted to situations where 
an appeal or review before a final decision was taken was already provided. 
The effect was to exclude the larger part of the field of public administration 
including, ironically, the grievance at the heart of the Crichel Down affair 
itself. So successful was their rhetoric that a decade later, when the question of 
the narrowness of the Franks Committee’s terms of reference arose in internal 
discussions, it was the point as to Parliamentary sovereignty, rather than the 
protection of administrative discretion, that was remembered as being the 
reason for the narrow reference.76  
 
But the civil service’s use of the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty was not 
entirely cynical. Whilst there was an element of calculation in portraying the 
proposal in this light, it also reflected a strongly held constitutional position, 
which saw in Parliament a forum to settle grievances of citizens against the 
government, with MPs playing the role of expert champions of righteous 
causes, and saw Parliamentary processes as flexible and nuanced in dealing 
with the complex questions of policy-making and discretion that such causes 
often raised. Constitutional principles such as ministerial responsibility, it was 
thought, gave this process force and effect. Parliamentary questions, in 
particular, were seen as being an extremely effective form of redress. Shortly 
after the release of The Rule of Law,77 which had prompted the Conservative 
manifesto commitment, C. W. B. Rankin, a permanent official in the Lord 
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Chancellor’s Department, wrote a memo strongly criticising the publication 
for giving “insufficient weight... to the power of the P[arliamentary] 
Q[uestion].” Everyone with any experience of administration, he went on, 
“knows what nervousness is engendered in Ministers and officials alike by 
PQs... and how often administrative action and practice are modified as a 
result of PQs.”78  
 
The same view also played a major role in the Douglas-Home government’s 
rejection in 1962 of the Whyatt report’s proposal for an ombudsman, over and 
above the issue of its interference with efficient administration.79 The 
ombudsman, it was argued, was necessary in Sweden because Sweden lacked a 
principle of ministerial control of the civil services, and of Parliamentary 
control over ministers through the institution of the Parliamentary Question.80 
To endow an administrative official with similar powers would interfere with a 
fundamental aspect of the British constitution. When a change of government 
resulted in the ombudsman being accepted, this nonetheless led to the 
institution of the MP filter—a restriction that was controversial at the time, 
but which was ultimately accepted on the basis that the ombudsman would 
function best if structured so as to be embedded within the system of 
parliamentary accountability, rather than sitting outside it as a quasi-judicial 
figure.81 Feelings on this ran strong. When the final bill went to the Legislation 
Committee, they proposed amending the title to read “The Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Administration (Ombudsman) Bill” to reflect its origins. Sir 
Laurence Helsby, who had succeeded Bridges, objected strongly (and 
successfully). The grounding of the Commissioner in Parliament, and in the 
British constitutional form of accountability must not, he argued, be diluted by 
adding a reference to an ‘ombudsman’.82  
 
The bureaucracy’s opposition to the legal review of administrative acts did not 
mean, therefore, that they wanted to leave aggrieved persons remediless. Their 
belief was instead that legalised, to say nothing of judicialised, remedies were 
inappropriate. The reaction to the Goodfellow report, discussed above, 
illustrates this well. There was agreement with the thrust of the “entirely 
reasonable and right” principles put forward in the report. But more would be 
lost than gained were the principles to be turned it into an “enforceable system 
of administrative law”.83 A code of administrative conduct was needed, but it 
must be one that was applied by “administrative means” rather than “legal 
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procedure”.84 And even this carried dangers. Civil servants worried that 
publicising the principles might lead to people using it as a yardstick to decide 
that they had been badly treated, and to creating a new category of cases for 
the Parliamentary Commissioner, where departments would be vulnerable.85 
The result would be to create “yet another obstacle to [civil servants] getting 
on with their jobs.”86 Sir Denis Dobson, Permanent Secretary to the Lord 
Chancellor’s Department, similarly thought that if the principles were widely 
applied, they “would lead to administrative chaos.”87 Whatever their merits in 
the abstract, therefore, the very act of introducing a code based on the 
principles drafted by Justice would be seriously disruptive.88 The correct forum 
was Parliament, and the correct legal principle was ministerial responsibility, 
because that did not seek to reduce complicated questions to matters of rules. 
Nor could tribunals fill the role, because they functioned best when they were 
dealing with clear rules.89 Administrators were not alone in holding this view. 
Warren Evans, who had played a role in the 1971 Report, thought that an 
Administrative Division should focus on procedural guarantees, and should 
not interfere with the exercise of administrative discretion. The report went 
too far in the direction of the latter.90  
 
This, then, was what was at stake in the debate between the reforming jurists 
on the one hand, and the bureaucracy and its supporters on the other. At its 
heart was a disagreement about what types of administrative action could or 
should be controlled, and how. It was taken as a given by all sides that some of 
the action taken would have to be internal to the administration—for example, 
improving the quality of the civil service, the focus of the Fulton Report91—
and that others, such as compliance with statutory requirements should be 
enforced by the courts. Beyond this, however, there were a range of questions 
to which the answer was far from clear. What values should the reviewing 
body be aiming to secure? What factors ought it to consider and be swayed by, 
and what ought it to ignore? Where should the bounds of its jurisdiction lie? 
Should the resolution of some issues be left to purely administrative 
processes?  
 
Reformers thought that the rule of law required some recognisably legal means 
of recourse: redress could not simply be a matter of grace, as it would be if it 
were left to purely internal mechanisms. It must be a matter of right, which 
would require “bringing the state under the law”.92 The administration, in 
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contrast, opposed judicialisation on the basis of the judiciary’s institutional 
capacity, of the executive’s institutional efficiency, and Parliament’s 
institutional role. The law, they said, must respect the integrity of the 
administrative process and the need for autonomy in the exercise of discretion. 
Decisions would sometimes be harsh to individuals, but this was also the case 
with tribunals or the courts. The fallacy of the reformers, as Harold Kent and 
Coldstream put it in an initial response to the Whyatt report, was “in the 
assumption that, contrary to all experience, life is just” and the assumption 
that the unfairness in the operation of the civil service was any worse than that 
in any other sector of life.93  
 
III. The Law Commission and the Law Lord 
 
In 1965, matters began to come to a head. The newly-formed Law 
Commission in its First Programme noted the need for “a proper balance to 
be struck” between the rule of law and “the administrative techniques of a 
highly developed industrial society.”94 But it added, “This is a very complicated 
problem upon which the Commission requires further time for study before 
making specific proposals.”95 In 1967, following a seminar at All Souls 
College, it issued a consultation paper, tentatively proposing a very broad 
review on this topic.96  
 
The consultation made no recommendations as to the shape of the reforms. 
Nevertheless, the departments reacted sharply. An interdepartmental 
committee was formed to co-ordinate responses, with a view to forestalling 
any wider review. After internal discussions, the Permanent Secretary (until 
1968) in the Lord Chancellor’s office, Sir George Coldstream put it to Mr. 
Justice Scarman, the head of the Law Commission, that the inquiry 
contemplated was not something the Law Commission could undertake. To 
do it properly would require a Royal Commission. Coldstream’s intent, 
apparently, was to persuade the Law Commission to abandon the project. 
Scarman was seemingly receptive to the argument, but not, as it transpired, in 
the manner Coldstream thought. The report it issued in 1969 described an 
inquiry into administrative law to be “so vital an issue that it calls for the 
judgment of a body which includes members with legal, administrative and 
political experience.”97 The report accordingly “envisage[d] an inquiry by a 
Royal Commission or by a committee of comparable status.”98  
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Scarman was careful not to publicly favour any particular outcome but support 
for a radical review was strong, and even its opponents in the Civil Service 
conceded the strength of the arguments for it. In a Departmental meeting, 
Lord Shackleton “agreed with the line that the discussion was taking,” (i.e., 
unenthusiastic), but nonetheless “wondered [whether] there might still not be 
case for a thorough study by, for example, a Royal Commission.”99 Lord 
Gardiner, the Lord Chancellor, was receptive to the need for a fundamental 
review, and was keen on instructing the Law Commission to at the very least 
conduct a wide-ranging review of remedies, if creating a Royal Commission 
proved difficult.  
 
Yet no such review took place. As one of us has discussed in more detail 
elsewhere,100 the archival record suggests that an important reason was the 
intervention of Lord Diplock, who had just been elevated to the House of 
Lords. Diplock’s views on administrative law had long been of interest to the 
administration. His name had come up in 1955 when the membership of the 
Franks Committee was being chosen: officials in the Lord Chancellor’s Office 
considered that he would be “fair-minded” even if he was inclined to be 
somewhat “‘agin’ the government”,101 unlike others who were rejected for 
being too “left-wing”.102 Ultimately, his name appears to have been struck off 
the list by a senior cabinet member.103 In 1969, Diplock had helped to organise 
an Anglo-American judicial exchange on administrative law. He now sent a 
report on that exchange to Lord Gardiner, where he expressly argued against 
any wider review of the type the Law Commission had recommended. The 
only topic that needed to be explored, he said, was simplifying the procedure 
associated with administrative redress.104  
 
The background to Diplock’s recommendation was the Quartet of decisions 
of the House of Lords in the 1960s, which dismantled legal doctrines that 
stood in the way of judicial scrutiny of administrative decisions. Diplock 
praised the general trend, arguing that the most appropriate way forward was 
to let judges continue to direct its development. Any wide-ranging review of 
the sort the Law Commission contemplated would simply get in the way. Yet 
to this he added one very significant qualification. In Diplock’s view, the 
principal problem with the US approach to reviewing administrative action, 
which otherwise had much to contribute to the development of English law, 
was that it led the courts to substitute their views on policy for those of the 
administrative decision maker. There was, he argued, a genuine danger that the 
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direction in which ‘jurisdiction’ was developing would, taken together with the 
power to review the record, lead to similar developments in England: a judge 
who called for and examined the record might be tempted to intervene 
because the conclusion lacked sufficient support. But the English courts could 
avoid problem if they handled the development of judicial review sensitively.  
 
Diplock’s report had its intended effect. Lord Gardiner directed the Law 
Commission to examine only the issue of procedure, precisely as Diplock had 
suggested. No equivalent to the Conseil d’État was ever created, and whilst 
ombudsmen and tribunals play an important role within the administrative 
justice system, they did not displace the courts. Judicial review expanded 
dramatically— in no small part under the guidance of Lord Diplock—but 
based on a far narrower approach to judicial oversight of the exercise of 
administrative discretion than any of the other approaches that were suggested 
in the 1960s. The ultimate denouement, however, was paradoxical for, as we 
will see, the very features that made this new approach seem so attractive in its 
early stages are also at the heart of much that makes judicial review so 
controversial today. Whilst Diplock’s memo seemed, in principle, to 
understand the importance and relevance of questions of institutional capacity, 
his concern was not respect for the integrity of the administrative process. 
Rather, his concern was to reduce challenges to questions which he thought 
the common law could answer, while suppressing doctrines that could, 
potentially, have invited judges to look into the substance of the decision.  
 
IV  The shape of administrative law 
 
Lord Diplock’s report suggested a form of review that was dramatically 
different from anything the reformers envisaged. Most fundamentally, it was 
concerned neither with the task of reviewing the rightness of a decision, nor 
with the balance between public and private interests on which the decision 
was based. Following a distinction noted in the Anglo-American exchange 
organised by Diplock, this approach can be seen as at once extending the 
availability of judicial review, while limiting its scope.105 And, when read in the 
light of Diplock’s report, the judicial decisions of the House of Lords through 
the 1970s and 1980s—a period in which it is generally taken to have been 
dominated by Diplock—can be seen as having fundamentally limited the 
direction of development of the common law in ways that echo the concerns 
raised in the report. Three points, in particular, characterise the approach that 
emerged in this period: a definition of legality that focuses exclusively on public 
interests (at the expense of the private interest), an approach to assessing legality 
that is textual rather than purposive, and a narrowing of the materials that 
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courts review in assessing the legality of a decision.  
 
To begin with the first of these, whereas the earlier debate had conceived of 
legality in terms of striking the right balance between individual interests and 
the public interest, the modern focus is on the scope and limits of the 
discretion that had been conferred on an administrator. The result is a 
reorientation of judicial review away from the mediatory issues that had been 
the primary focus of the debate throughout the period leading up to the 1960s, 
and towards a new and entirely ‘public’ task—namely, that of enforcing public 
duties. As we have seen, mediating between private interests and the public 
interest was central to virtually every reform effort in the twentieth century. It 
was at the heart of the debates surrounding the Crown Proceedings Act. It led 
to the discretion/maladministration duality which so vexed Coldstream and 
Kent when it appeared in the Whyatt report. It was the primary impetus 
behind the proposals to create an ombudsman and a new system of tribunals, 
and behind J. D. B. Mitchell’s proposal for a new, reinvigorated Privy Council, 
fashioned after the Conseil d’État. Against this light, a peculiar feature of the 
system of judicial review that emerged is that, as Sir Harry Woolf argued in his 
Hamlyn lectures, the private interest matters only to the competence to bring 
an action: once standing has been established, it has little, if any, role to play in 
relation to the substance of the challenge.106  
 
The implications of this shift are considerable. Its effect, in Woolf’s words, is 
to make the primary purpose of judicial review “enforcing public duties on 
behalf of the public as a whole”.107 If it upholds individual interests, it does so 
tangentially “as part of the process of ensuring that public bodies do not act 
unlawfully and do perform their public duties.” Woolf argued that this was a 
good thing, because the wider public who have an interest in effective public 
programmes are not represented in an action. Yet it represents a radical 
departure from the manner in which the problem was conceptualised for 
much of the twentieth century – and, indeed, from the way in which the 
parties themselves conceive of the nature of the dispute they have taken to 
court. Private interests become, in this orientation, at most an incidental 
concern. As we saw earlier, the reformers saw no fundamental conflict 
between advancing the public interest and mediating between public and 
private interests. And in keeping with this perspective, earlier discussions of 
prerogative remedies emphasised the protection of individual interests as 
much as enforcing the public interest. These extraordinary remedies were 
available, Keir and Lawson wrote in their influential text, even though “no 
civil wrong has been committed: there has been no contract to break and no 
right of anyone has been infringed. And yet it may be obvious that the 
subject’s interests have been adversely affected by unlawful control on the part 
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of the authority.”108 Not only was the Diplockean understanding a departure 
from the academics of his day, it also turned on their head the original 
understanding of authorities like Shaw which on their face are entirely 
consistent with the ‘mediatory’ conception of public law, and indeed had been 
understood in precisely this way by Keir and Lawson, amongst others.  
 
This departure also extends to the manner in which legality is assessed. A central 
feature in judicial review is that the scope and limits of the power conferred 
upon the administrative body in question are construed in a process that is 
primarily textual. On the one hand, administrative law is supposedly derived 
from constitutional principle. A notable feature of Lord Reid’s decisions in the 
Quartet is the way that common law and statute are woven into a seamless 
whole, drawing on common law principles to infer the extent of Parliament’s 
intent to over-ride individual interests or confer statutory immunities on 
public bodies. In contrast, the jurisprudence of the 1970s and 1980s, and 
particularly decisions delivered by Lord Diplock, abandon such “common law 
constitutionalism” (to use a phrase which only later became fashionable) in 
favour of a close reading of the applicable statutory framework. General 
principles of administrative law—where they exist at all—are to be found 
within the legal framework established by Parliament, rather than having any 
separate existence in common law.  
 
In Bromley LBC v Greater London Council (the “Fares Fair” case),109 for example, 
Diplock criticised the approach of his fellow judges of “limiting consideration 
of the construction of the statute” only to considerations of vires and not to 
review of discretion. Diplock saw it, “the question of discretion is, in my view, 
inseparable from the question of construction.” Here the key question for 
Diplock is this: taken as a whole, what questions did the statutory scheme 
leave open to the authority? While agreeing with the majority that GLC failed 
its fiduciary duty to rate-payers, his approach was quite different, deriving the 
existence of such a duty from the statutory framework under which the GLC 
provided passenger transport services.  
 
Similar reasoning can be found in Tameside.110 The statutory framework, he 
argued, gave the LEA responsibility “for the actual provision of pubic 
education services”, while the Secretary of State’s functions were “supervisory 
only”.111 The scheme of the Act thus left Tameside with a broad, almost 
untramelled discretion, subject only to the Secretary of State’s power, 
predicated on a finding that the LEA had acted or intended to act 
unreasonably, to issue directions to the LEA. Such a finding was a matter for 
the Secretary of State, with the court’s power of review confined to the 
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question of whether the Secretary of State had “…taken consideration of the 
matters which upon the true construction of the Act he ought to have 
considered and excluded from his consideration matters that were irrelevant to 
what he had to consider…”112  
 
There is a close affinity with the Wednesbury formulation of Lord Greene—for 
whom Diplock had acted as Secretary to the Master of the Rolls in the 
1940s113—and the purpose is the same: to divert judicial scrutiny away from 
any consideration of the merits of the decision. A contrast may be drawn with 
Padfield.114 Lord Reid had rejected the suggestion—accepted by Lord Diplock 
in the Court of Appeal—that the Minister need only direct himself to the 
relevant question. For Reid, “Parliament must have conferred the discretion 
with the intention that it should be used to promote the policy and objects of 
the Act; the policy and objects of the Act must be determined by construing 
the Act as a whole and construction is always a matter for the Court”.115 On 
Reid’s analysis, the power was part of a scheme intended to limit how far 
individuals’ interests may be subordinated to the public interest, and for the 
Minister to refuse to activate such safeguards out of political convenience was 
to frustrate the public interest. Diplock’s approach turns this on its head, by 
reading express provisions as to the protection of private interests in purely 
textual terms.  
 
Just as cases like Fare’s Fair and Tameside sought to reduce the review of 
discretion to the question of statutory construction, a similar thrust to 
subsume the rules of natural justice under the principle of ultra vires can 
arguably be seen in Diplock’s famous articulation of the grounds of judicial 
review in GCHQ. Diplock favoured the term procedural impropriety 
“…because susceptibility to judicial review under this head covers also failure 
by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid 
down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even 
where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice.”116 While this 
might seem like an exercise in taxonomy without practical importance, the 
effect of this move is apparent in Bushell v. Secretary of State for the Environment.117 
Here, Diplock eschews the traditional term “natural justice”, because this 
“may suggest that the only prototype is to be found in procedures followed by 
English courts of law”, proceeding instead on the basis of the statutory 
framework precisely as he did with the issue of abuse of discretion in Fare’s 
Fair. Diplock found that “in the absence of any rules made under the 
Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1971, the only requirement of the Highways Act 
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1959, as to the procedure to be followed at a local inquiry…is that it must be 
fair to all those who have an interest in the decision…whether they have been 
represented at the inquiry or not.”118 Again, the effect is to limit the inquiry 
largely to the statutory framework, in a manner that effectively robs the law of 
any unifying or overarching constitutional principles.  
 
Third, and related, was a preoccupation with the extent and nature of the 
materials coming before the court. “The minimum requirement for effective 
judicial review of administrative decisions on questions of law,” wrote Diplock 
in his memo, “is that there should be available to the reviewing court sufficient 
material to enable it to ascertain whether the decision-making authority has 
misconstrued the powers conferred upon it by legislation, or has made some 
other error of law.”119 On the other hand, he argued, if the English courts 
were given a complete record of proceedings (as was the case under the US 
“substantial evidence rule”), judges would be tempted to substitute their own 
views about sound policy for those of the primary decision-maker. Diplock 
was especially concerned that the development of administrative law on 
jurisdiction, following Anisminic might be used to justify such an expansion of 
material coming before the court.  
 
The problem with Anisminic was that the error of law made by the Foreign 
Compensation Commission was not disclosed by the record of the tribunal 
decision, but was instead revealed in a memo which came to light in the course 
of discovery—this being possible since the action was one for declaration. “If 
the court was to be enabled to correct” this error, as Diplock put it extra-
judicially, “this had to be classified as one which went to jurisdiction.”120 Lord 
Reid had neatly overcome this hurdle, by extending the concept of jurisdiction 
beyond the straightforward question of whether the decision-maker was 
entitled to make the decision in question, to encompass situations where 
although so entitled, “it has done or failed to do something in the course of 
the inquiry which is of such a nature that its decision is a nullity.”121 The 
danger, as Diplock saw it, was that this potentially expanded the amount of 
material coming before the court with the very results that so worried him in 
his memo.  
 
Diplock’s response to this development was—at the doctrinal level—to re-
interpret Anisminic as having effectively abolished the very distinction between 
errors of law that went to jurisdiction and those that did not, In O’Reilly v 
Mackman122 Diplock described this distinction as “esoteric”, arguing that 
Anisminic had “liberated English public law from the fetters that the courts had 
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imposed upon themselves” by such a distinction.123 This repeated the view he 
expressed in Re Racal,124 where he went so far as to say that “The break-
through made by Anisminic” was that “the old distinction between errors of 
law that went to jurisdiction and errors of law that did not was, for practical 
purposes abolished.”125 One consequence of this, Diplock wrote extra-
judicially, was that “technicalities as to what constitutes the ‘record’ for the 
purposes of review no longer matter.”126  
 
Much has been written about whether Anisminic did or did not intend to 
abolish this distinction.127 Critically, however, the effect of Diplock’s ruling 
was to severely limit the discovery of departmental material in judicial review 
cases. Abolishing the distinction also eliminated the need to call for the record, 
which proved an important step to eliminating discovery more generally. 
Diplock praised the procedure under Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1958 
whereby a brief statement of reasons for the decision was provided. In 
planning appeals in particular, this information was provided in a “in a form 
which identifies what was the choice of answer which the Minister treated as 
being open to him.”128 Judges had in such cases been “reasonably successful in 
developing the necessary self-restraint”.129 The problem was that outside the 
limited class of Ministerial decisions to which the 1958 Act applied, there was 
no means to compel such a statement.130  
 
The procedural reforms of 1977–1981 did not, on the face of things, enact any 
reform along the lines suggested by Lord Diplock. The revised judicial 
procedure contained no specific power to call for such a statement. Instead, 
Rule 8 of Order 53 made available in judicial review proceedings the same 
powers to compel production of evidence as applied in ordinary civil cases.131 
Yet modern judicial review practice largely dispenses with such procedures, 
relying instead on a sworn affidavit as Diplock proposed. This practice is 
praised by Woolf as an example of cooperation between the departments and 
the courts.132 The limits of the practice can be seen in GCHQ, where, counsel 
for the unions had averred that the national security rationale for the ban on 
union membership had been an “afterthought”, i.e. had been used to justify 
the decision ex post facto. As Griffith notes, the sworn statement of the Cabinet 
Secretary that national security was involved was taken by the Lords to be 
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conclusive of the issue.133 Moreover, Woolf’s rosy assessment of the co-
operation between the departments and the courts in the 1990s seems unduly 
complacent in the light of Lord Justice Scott’s revelations about the use of 
Public Interest Immunity certificates to conceal from the courts the extent of 
the Government’s involvement in Iraq’s arms procurement network.134  
 
The rationale behind this trend becomes clear when we put it in the context of 
Lord Diplock’s stated concerns as to the deplorable effect that viewing the 
broader record might have on a court. As he stated in his memo, it was 
precisely such a process that was the first step on the slippery slope that would 
end with judges routinely setting aside administrative decisions simply because 
they disagree. Yet it has come at a price that is not trivial. It is ironic that the 
result is to make the outcome in Anisminic itself one that could not be reached 
today, because the record would not under current practice be examined.  
 
 
V Conclusions: The making or unmaking of administrative law? 
 
This, then, is the story of the birth of our modern law of judicial review. It is a 
story of how, despite an ambitious and broad-based reform movement, the 
development of the law was channelled along narrow, primarily procedural 
lines. And it is a story which challenges conventional assumptions about how 
the common law gets made. As we have shown, the shape of modern 
administrative law doctrine owes as much to bureaucratic politics, closed-
doors discussion, and behind-the-scenes intrigue as it does to the process of 
continuous, incremental development through which judicial review is usually 
thought to have emerged. To be sure, a series of key speeches of Lord Diplock 
articulated the key doctrinal principles on which modern law is built, and to 
this extent his reputation as the ‘father of administrative law’ is well-deserved. 
But it is equally true that these principles did not emerge in isolation. It was 
the bureaucratic lobbying of Coldstream and Kent, and the backdoor 
intervention of Lord Diplock himself, that created the conditions in which 
modern judicial review could assume its modern doctrinal shape.  
 
Yet it is in terms of its consequences of a shift in legal thinking about remedies 
against the state that the story is most striking, because–by pointing to the 
intentionally restricted nature of the development of judicial review–it 
demonstrates the continued failure of the law to provide effective remedies for 
executive over-reach. In this final, concluding section, we set out what we see 
as some of the enduring consequences of the peculiar circumstances of the 
origins of our modern law.  
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A first point to be made concerns the foundations of the modern law. By the 
mid-1990s, a Lord Chancellor could, without controversy, describe it (extra-
judicially) as “axiomatic of the system of judicial review in this country…[that] 
the court must rule only upon the legality of a decision and not upon its 
correctness; the court will concern itself with the manner in which a decision 
is reached rather than with the substantive merits of the decision itself.”135 As 
this quote suggests, modern judicial review is grounded in a judicial philosophy 
in which–save in exceptional circumstances–only vires in the narrow sense or 
breach of essential procedural requirements justifies judicial intervention. It 
was precisely this narrow, vires-based understanding that the reformers of the 
1960s sought to challenge, and they did so out of their own concerns with 
constitutional principle. They were concerned with upholding the rule of law 
in the face of the growth of the administrative state; but this was not just a 
matter of resisting the administrative state. As important to them was the 
salutary impact which they expected the resulting principles of good 
governance to have on the conduct of administrative business, by providing 
the same level of guidance that private law provided to the conduct of private 
business. So fundamentally has the understanding of the British constitution 
changed in the years since that we today see any judicial engagement with the 
merits of a discretionary decision as an affront to the proper judicial role.  
 
The mere fact that received understanding of the constitution has changed 
does not, of course, mean that the change is for the worse. In evaluating the 
development of judicial review since the 1970s it is worth asking whether, in 
the light of experience, the abandonment of the approach of the mid-20th 
century has been a change to the good. Two points suggest that it has not.  
 
Firstly, as the reformers recognised, the defendant in the action—the 
government department or other public body—does not enjoy any legally 
protected interests of its own: there is only the public interest in it performing 
its activities effectively. In the modern system, however, the scrutiny to which 
this public interest is subjected is a strange one. Rather than a contest between 
the private interest of the applicants and the public interest pursued by the 
department, as the reformers cogently argued was necessary, what we get is the 
paradoxical articulation of the public interest by an applicant who is actually 
seeking to protect a private interest, to which the department which is actually 
seeking to defend a public interest is constrained to respond with reference to 
everything save that public interest. The result is an action where pleading can 
never be more than strategic, and where the principles used to decide the 
dispute have little to do with the actual nature of the underlying conflict. 
Within this tortured setup, it is perhaps not surprising that the law has little to 
say in terms of general, substantive principles of good governance. It allows 
for very little reading across of principles and duties from one context to 
another.  
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The result for our law, as D. G. T. Williams has identified, is that, “Precedent 
is only sporadically important, and binding precedent is rare…” 136 The 
frequent repetition of “hallowed statements of principle”, he suggests, gives 
the appearance of consistency, but is “in truth employed to allow the judges 
considerable flexibility on a case-by-case basis.”137 The underlying problem is 
that the distinction between merits and process, which has become 
foundational to the modern approach, is not at all easy draw in particular 
cases. The result is that the courts are drawn into matters of substance, but 
lack the doctrinal tools to approach such questions in a principled and 
methodical way.  
 
One consequence of this is that our administrative law has mostly done a poor 
job of articulating—except in very vague terms bordering on the vacuous—
standards of good administration, which can usefully guide civil servants in the 
exercise of their public powers. This is a problem for administrators as much 
for those who seek to challenge official decisions. James points out that the 
law on judicial review is helpful to administrators in articulating broad 
constitutional principles, but offers little guidance to administrators tasked 
with decision-making under broad areas of statutory discretion.138 As our 
analysis has shown, administrators do have a conception of the rule of law, and 
of constitutional propriety more generally, but the modern law structures the 
judges’ discretion in a way that makes it impossible to engage with this 
administrative constitutionalism.  
 
This problem, too, was well understood by the reformers, especially Mitchell; 
yet a consequence of the modern approach is that it has remained unaddressed 
in modern doctrine. The effect on a department of being subject to a 
successful judicial review has been likened to being struck by lightning—
random, unpredictable and destructive—but the effects in terms of improving 
the quality of administration are contestable. A large section of the literature 
on the bureaucratic impact of judicial review is sceptical that judicial review 
has any impact on administrative decision-making, outside the decision 
challenged, or at most on the narrow class of decisions to which a specific 
statutory provision applies.139 The work of Maurice Sunkin and his 
collaborators forms an exception, but it is profoundly significant that the 
specific decisions they highlighted as having improved the functioning of local 
authorities related to Part III of the Children Act 1989, one of the few areas of 
public powers in which the structure of powers and duties conferred by statute 
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are in fact articulated in terms of duties to protect private interests, with the 
result that the law both empowers and compels judges hearing cases in this 
area to articulate substantive principles about the boundary between public 
powers and private immunities.140 The cases under the Children Act 1989 
instantiate the type of system that the reformers of the mid-20th century 
would have envisaged.  
 
This may go some way towards explaining the “very defensive” and 
“somewhat petulant” tone141 of the (in)famous civil service guide to judicial 
review for civil servants, The Judge Over Your Shoulder. But the rise of human 
rights challenges, and the extension of human rights jurisprudence into areas 
which critics of the Human Rights Act regard as far-removed from the 
concerns of the framers of the European Convention on Human Rights is also 
readily explicable against this background. Proportionality review explicitly 
balances the private interest of the applicant against the public interest pursued 
by the department, and the review is expressly about whether the balance 
struck by the department was struck in the right place. As such, it is one of the 
few ways of ‘getting at’ the underlying basis of the dispute, and for the 
claimant to articulate the true legal need that motivates the challenge, namely, 
that he or she feels hard done by. The restriction of proportionality review to 
matters of EU law and human rights arguably therefore goes some way to 
accounting for the expansionary pressure placed on those bodies of law–which 
in turn may in part explain why their legitimacy has come under such scrutiny 
in recent years.  
 
The failure of ordinary domestic law to address such issues is, then, the biggest 
failure of the development of modern judicial review, and is arguably part of 
the reason why the procedural reforms of the previous coalition government 
were premised on a view of judicial review as damaging to the administration, 
rather than—in the bigger picture—helpful in structuring administrative 
decisions. Yet it is hard to see how the proposed restriction of judicial review 
will alter the position. Just as litigants have turned to human rights arguments 
to bring their disputes within the terms in which the courts can give a remedy, 
further efforts to restrict the availability of judicial review may only serve to 
exercise the ingenuity of litigants and their counsel; which, in turn may 
increase the uncertainty as to how the principles of judicial review apply. Until 
the nettle of substantive law reform of administrative law is grasped, the 
situation is unlikely to change.  
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